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Replication and reproduction: crises in psychology and academic labour  
Felicity Callard 




Discussions of the replication crisis in psychology require more substantive analysis of the crisis of 
academic labour and of social reproduction in the university, not least because both the replication 
crisis and the crisis of social reproduction in the university describe a failure in the processes of 
reproducing something. That the financial crisis of 2007–8 shortly preceded the emergence of the 
replication crisis, as well as exacerbated ongoing tendencies in the organisation and practices of 
university research (particularly the use of precarious contracts and the adjunctification of research), 
indicates the importance of addressing these two crises together. Many analyses of and responses 
to the replication crisis turn to research culture, often at the expense of adequate investigations of 
research labour. Today’s psychological sciences are made through multiple forms of labour: these 
include researchers, who range from senior principal investigators to sub-contracted, and exploited, 
research assistants working; research participants/subjects, who include those providing labour for 
experiments via exploitative platforms including Amazon’s Mechanical Turk; and workers providing 
heterogeneous technical and administrative labour. Through considering these multiple forms of 
labour, discussions of psychology might better analyse the problems besetting psychology today, as 




The labour of replication  
 
‘Is psychology suffering from a replication crisis? What does “failure to replicate” really mean?’ 
(Maxwell et al., 2015) 
‘What does it mean to say there is a crisis in academic labor?’ (Moten & Harney, 1999) 
 
In the first quotation above, Scott Maxwell and colleagues survey the scene in psychology in 
the second decade of the twenty-first century and ask why many experimental results appear to fail 
to reproduce themselves. In the second quotation, Fred Moten and Stefano Harney survey the scene 
of academic labour at the very end of the twentieth century and ask, ‘Why did this generation [of 
the 1960-80s] fail to reproduce itself?’ Both questions wonder about what causes the processes of 
reproducing something to fail: in the first case, a repetition of an experiment in the service of 
corroborating results; in the second, a process of social reproduction through which conditions of 
labour and consciousness are remade within the university. What might be gleaned by placing these 
two questions – which both address reproduction and their apparent failure – alongside one 
another? Replication and reproduction name what repeats; what recurs. Replication describes the 
process of reproducing something, and reproduction, like replication, can involve the producing of 
phenomena in the form of a copy.1 My contribution to this special issue on the replication of crises 
departs from the observation that while replication and reproduction are intimate neighbours, 
replication in psychology and (social) reproduction in the university have not adequately been 
considered together, even as both are assumed, by many, to be ‘in crisis’. One good indicator of 
their general distance from one another is that precarity, casualization, exploitation and working 
conditions within the academy (Brienza, 2016; Carpenter et al., 2021; Kezar et al., 2019; Loveday, 
2018; Peacock, 2016; Thorkelson, 2016) are rarely a central focus of debates and writings addressing 
 
1 Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. replication; reproduction.  
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the replication crisis in and beyond psychology. I sketch out some of the reasons why this might be 
the case and why it is worth thinking (experimental) replication and (social) reproduction together. 
Bringing these literatures more closely together will help us understand not only which concepts and 
frameworks are – and aren’t – being used to address the ‘replication crisis’ in psychology, but will 
also provide greater clarity in understanding which modes of socio-political intervention might – and 
might not – help address phenomena that are considered to be in a state of crisis. It will also clarify 
how the epistemological domain of psychology imagines, writes about, and indeed constitutes itself, 
today. Another way of saying all this is that If you are worried about reproducibility in psychology, 
you should be worried about current conditions undergirding the reproduction of labour in the 
university.  
 Nick Mitchell, in his writings on the university, has demonstrated how the ‘materiality of the 
labor practices’ underlying the production of knowledge shapes the form that epistemic domains 
take (Mitchell, 2015, 2019; undercommoning, 2016). Following Mitchell opens up different ways of 
understanding disciplinary histories. Mitchell writes in particular about the formation of the 
discipline of ethnic studies in relation to the site of the university: the emergence of ethnic studies in 
the United States, Mitchell insists, relied on an early form of adjunct labour. In recounting this 
history, Mitchell undercovers what is at stake in how this field, and its history, is envisaged: ‘forms of 
fantasy’ consolidate one part of a history – namely, the radicality of ethnic studies – but occlude the 
reliance on adjunct professors that underpinned the field’s emergence (undercommoning, 2016). 
The materiality of labour practices has been excised from accounts of the solidification of ethnic 
studies in the university; so, too, has the materiality of labour been largely kept out of discussions of 
the ‘replication crisis’ in psychology. The task is to grasp the work that keeping the ‘labour ecology of 
today’s academy’ (Mitchell, 2019) out of consideration does. How does it shape what the replication 
crisis is imagined to be, as well as the potential routes or interventions that are envisaged as able to 
ameliorate or resolve it? I explore two dominant and related fantasies underpinning discussions of 
the replication crisis: (i) that the generic and universalized figure of ‘the psychologist’ is the 
 4 
appropriate protagonist and focal point for these discussions; and (ii) that much of the work of the 
psychological sciences is imagined to take place without workers.  
 
The labour of research 
 
The ‘replication crisis’, as a phenomenon and an object of analytic concern, has been 
defined and analysed by multiple actors. There is neither wholehearted agreement on the 
lineaments of this crisis nor, indeed, on whether there is a crisis.2 The phrase ‘replication crisis’ is 
usually used to signal concern that the findings from many experimental studies appear to be unable 
to be reproduced: this, for some, places psychology’s experimental robustness in doubt. While much 
of the focus of concern has been on questions of psychological method, analyses of the replication 
crisis have demonstrated how broad epistemological and ontological questions are also at stake. 
Deliberations over how psychology comes to know, as well as how psychology envisages its scientific 
objects entail deliberations over professional norms and values, since norms and values guide 
epistemological and ontological assumptions, and vice versa (Flis, 2019; Morawski, 2019; Wiggins & 
Christopherson, 2019). Writings addressing the replication crisis thereby intersect with a broad set 
of literature on current arrangements governing and infrastructures surrounding university research 
(e.g. the proliferation of rankings, metrics, and other evaluative techniques (Burrows, 2012), the 
pressure to acquire grants (Lilienfeld, 2017), and practices of academic gaming (Biagioli et al., 2019)). 
Diverse actors who wish to intervene to ameliorate or resolve the crisis have therefore proposed a 
series of changes to the operations and overarching governance of the psychological and other 
sciences – as well as to their methods. These include practices of open science, the increasing of 
 
2 The phrase reproducibility crisis is also used, and there is ongoing debate over whether the terms 
replicability and reproducibility should be distinguished from one another in relation to discussions 
around scientific practice (see Nelson et al., 2021). 
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transparency, improvements in scientific efficiency, corrections in relation to the use of statistics, 
prescriptions for how replication studies ought to be undertaken, requirements for certain practices 
of reporting, improvements in scientific training, and shifts in the incentives and plaudits that 
surround scientific research (e.g. Button et al., 2013; Munafò et al., 2020; Nosek et al., 2015; Tackett 
et al., 2019). At the heart of many of these efforts to improve scientific practice lies the figure of the 
psychologist herself.  
To provide scaffolding for the argument I pursue in the remainder of this article, I take up 
the writings of Jill Morawski, historian of psychology, on the replication crisis. Morawski has 
provided some of most astute assessments of how the subjectivity of the psychologist – and in 
particular the psychology of the psychologist – figures disproportionately in those debates 
(Morawski, 2019, 2020; see also Flis, 2019). Not only is the psychologist considered to be subject to 
cognitive bias (e.g. confirmation bias, hindsight bias), but in fact many of her intimate characteristics 
(her ‘cognitions, emotions, lived experiences, and behaviors’) might well contribute to the problems 
described under the phrase replication crisis. Morawski argues: 
 
Intertwined with technical matters of research methods and normative conduct, 
assessments of psychologists form part of a conceptual web that links a belief that 
replication is the “cornerstone” of science with a related belief that objectivity is its 
foundation. In turn, these epistemic premises are connected with beliefs about 
psychologists’ psychology and allied conceptions of psychologists as moral and public actors. 
(2020, p. 178) 
 
Psychologizing the psychologist is one of the motors through which the replication crisis in 
psychology keeps turning: Morawski notices how many ‘appraisals … target, both directly and 
indirectly, problems of the researcher as individual actor’ (Morawski, 2020, p. 177). The figure of the 
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psychologist must be exhorted, encouraged, and incentivized to act differently – even as many of 
the psychological attributes that are understood to be problematic are difficult to shift.  
What is noticeable for Morawski, in current writings addressing the replication crisis, is the 
absence of cultural analyses of the crisis (i.e. analyses that would place this scientific crisis in a 
broader cultural context). For Morawski, such an absence ‘might be itself symptomatic’ (Morawski, 
2019, p. 233). If you agree with Morawski that something symptomatic might be at work – and I do – 
the question then arises: Symptomatic of what? Morawski contends that this lack of cultural analysis 
is perhaps not unconnected to the ‘dire cultural climate in which [the current crisis] is transpiring’ 
(Morawski, 2019, p. 221). She links concern about ‘unreliable knowledge and questionable research’ 
to the financial crisis of 2007–2008 and its sequelae (including the coming to light of doubtful, at 
times criminal financial practices), as well as increased contestation over what constitutes a fact. 
Here, Morawski extends an hypothesis that others, elsewhere, have attempted to investigate 
empirically. Walsh and colleagues, for example, have explored whether countries with ‘higher rates 
of societal (business, government) corruption have higher rates of pathologies in science’; they make 
reference to how high stakes incentives can lead to excessive risk tasking (and here they mention 
estate agents and bankers and mortgage bankers prior to the financial crisis) (Walsh et al., 2019). I 
welcome further investigations of a potential relationship between the emergence of the 
‘replication crisis’ and the financial practices that accompanied the financial crisis of 2007–2008. But 
what I am struck by here is what is still not explicitly named, either by Morawski or indeed by other 
authors writing on the replication crisis. That is the consequence for labour of that crash and its 
aftermath – as well as the potential bearing of those consequences on the emergence, persistence, 
and very shape of a ‘crisis of replication’.  
The financial crisis exerted profound and ongoing aftershocks on the ecology of research 
inside the university and in para-university research spaces. Decreases in public expenditure on 
research following the crisis (OECD, 2021) were accompanied, in many countries, by austerity 
policies and labour reforms that exacerbated on-going tendencies in the organisation and practices 
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of university research. These increased and intensified: the use of precarious contracts and the 
adjunctification of research; workloads and productivity expectations; the ‘projectification’ of 
research; the introduction of new forms of digital labour; and the further entanglement of private 
companies in the assemblage making up higher education (Herschberg et al., 2018; Komljenovic, 
2019; Schwaller, 2019). It is difficult to track how exactly those working in the psychological sciences 
have been affected, not least because data are not always available to understand shifts in the use 
of postdoctoral, fixed-term and other kinds of casualised positions, nor what those inhabiting those 
positions go on to do (Woolston, 2020). Research from the United States National Postdoc Survey 
published in 2018 indicates that in the US, only approximately 15% of those in post-doctoral 
positions (across all disciplines) go on to tenure-track positions (McConnell et al., 2018). In relation 
to psychology specifically, the US College and University Professional Association for Human 
Resources (CUPA-HR) reported that the growth of non-tenure track teaching positions in psychology 
was slower than it was in many other disciplines: while from 2014 to 2019 non-tenure-track full-time 
teaching faculty increased steadily as a percentage of all faculty (moving from being approximately a 
quarter to being approximately one third), non-tenure-track faculty in psychology made up 22% of 
faculty positions in 2019 and had increased proportionally less quickly (Bichsel et al., 2019). (We 
should note that these figures do not include non-tenure research faculty.) More broadly, as 
Carpenter, Goldblatt and Hanson (2021), amongst others, have argued, higher education is 
experiencing a particular crisis of social reproduction: many university systems are increasingly ‘sites 
of accumulation’, and certainly cannot be assumed – as they often were, post-war – to be acting 
predominantly as sites of production for a future workforce or in relation to national culture.3 This 
has meant the creation of revenue streams that require high levels of indebtedness in students, as 
well as high levels of exploitation, casualization and unemployment amongst many employees 
 
3 The highly financialized UK and US university sector comprises the primary focus of my thinking in 
this article, though many of the arguments are, I believe, relevant beyond those countries. 
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(Carpenter et al., 2021; Torracinta, 2020). There are many ways in which such processes – and the 
shifts in work practices that accompany them – might intersect with the concerns raised by those 
writing about the replication crisis. For example: How do such processes affect how data are 
collected, analysed, stored and shared, and broaden the kinds of actors who gather and have access 
to such data? Or how research participants are recruited, consented into research, and 
compensated? Or shift where time and focus is – and is no longer – able to be spent in the carrying 
out and reviewing of scientific research? Or affect how spatially and temporally distantiated 
researchers finds ways, as they collaborate, to ensure the comparability of data, or standardise 
modes of measuring and recording? Or intensify hierarchical relationships that are embedded 
through unequal contract arrangements, and which hence potentially change collaborative practices 
and modes of communication?  
The labour required to design, carry out, analyse, and disseminate psychological research is, 
moreover, multiple. The labour of psychological researchers themselves is intensely heterogeneous: 
researchers range from senior principal investigators, to stably employed academics, to serial 
postdoctoral researchers, to doctoral and pre-doctoral students, to contracted out and zero-hour-
contract research assistants. (And let us leave to one side the numerous sites beyond the university, 
and para-university research spaces, where psychological research is being undertaken.) The labour 
of research participants/subjects is also required for the production of psychological research, as 
well as for disciplinary reproduction. And, crucially, today’s psychological research assemblage 
requires multiple other kinds of work, both technical and administrative, which is often not 
envisaged as part of research, though is fundamental to it (Barley & Bechky, 1994). These require 
many different kinds of skill; are often spatially stretched over significant distances and country 
borders that cross the Global South and Global North; are often mediated through multiple 
intersecting infrastructures (including complex networks that bring together information 
technologies, artificial intelligence, metrics and databases, and publishing); and often involve actors, 
including corporate actors, in and outside the university. Morawski (2020) and Flis (2019) have 
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rightly diagnosed that there is ample reflection on how psychologists’ psychology might affect the 
conduct of scientific research, and hence might bear on matters of affect reproducibility. But there is 
little similar attention to the materiality either of the psychologist’s labour (physical, mental, 
emotional), or of the labour of those with whom she requires contact, directly or indirectly, in the 
pursuit of scientific research.  
The replication crisis, Morawski argues, shows up an intimate relationship between 
questions of epistemology and questions of ethos: how scientists know is deeply connected to how 
scientists think about themselves as scientific selves (see also Anderson, 2008; Galison & Daston, 
2008). But if we are to understand how the epistemic constraints and norms that govern 
psychological research are themselves attached to particular kinds of social formations, we need to 
attend more carefully to how such social formations are shaped through diverse kinds of labour 
relations. If questions of ethos and epistemology foreground considerations of morals, values, and 
norms, these do not float free from the labour relations through which they emerge and in which 
they are entangled (see, for example, Bigg, 2000). But discourse surrounding the replication crisis, 
when addressing questions of epistemology and ethos, disproportionately addresses behaviour and 
not labour relations. We find concerns with behaviours, which are understood to be nested within, 
and often responsive to, particular facets of what is termed scientific culture. Behaviours are, 
moreover, often understood through frameworks both psychological and (neoclassical-)economic. 
As Morawski has noted, it is understood to be ‘self-interested maximizing’ behaviour that produces 
scientists’ problematic behaviours, such as competitive struggles over publishing eye-catching 
findings, or the ‘salami-slicing’ of research findings to maximize the number of publications 
(Morawski, 2020, p. 186).  
Such neo-classical economic and psychological frameworks narrow the horizons of what is 
envisaged as malleable and re-makeable. Incentive structures can be altered, and indeed should be 
altered, to push particular behaviours in a different direction. Larivière and colleagues, in their 
analysis of authorship, emphasise the importance of contributorship and contributor statements, 
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given the growing fragmentation of tasks that characterizes collaborative research (Larivière et al., 
2016). Horbach and colleagues, in an empirical investigation of the reporting of research misconduct 
note the role of power relations in the reporting of such misconduct, pointing to how ‘younger 
researchers, researchers with temporary appointments and those in lower academic positions are 
less likely to act and report than their senior and permanently appointed colleagues’ (Horbach et al., 
2020). But while such research does consider discuss divisions of labour, it shies away from 
investigation of the material underpinnings and consequences of such division of labour. That would 
help elucidate not only what might be driving the fragmentation of tasks but how such 
fragmentation has the potential to make adjudications of research (mis)conduct and responsibility 
more complex and difficult. Romero, in an article that confidently specifies who should perform 
replication labour (2018), proposes ‘intervening on the social structure of science’ by creating 
‘confirmation-research-track positions’ in which researchers would focus entirely on replication 
work. While Romero discusses how such new positions would demand changes in tenure and 
promotion guidelines, as well as the role that governments and private funders might play in 
supporting such positions, he avoids any discussion of the current vicissitudes facing researchers or 
of the upheavals in and pressures facing the funding of any kind of research position. It is indeed 
difficult to find writings that bear on questions of replication and reproducibility that manifest 
sustained interest in the broader political-economy of either the sciences or the university (Berman, 
2012; cf. Sunder Rajan, 2007). 
 
Research culture, transparency, and efficiency  
 
Culture, unlike labour, is explicitly named in multiple writings addressing the replication 
crisis. Consider, for example, Marcus Munafò and colleagues’ article ‘Research culture and 
reproducibility’ (2020). In it, they noted that ‘culture is both pervasive and difficult to observe’: 
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We create our culture, invisible though it may be, and we therefore have it collectively 
within ourselves to change our culture for the better. Our institutions in particular, as 
repositories of this culture, can also be crucial in fostering change. (2020, p. 92) 
 
Or consider an article co-authored five years earlier by Brian Nosek, another prominent figure keen 
to reform practices of science in light of his understanding of the replication crisis. That article was 
titled ‘Promoting an open research culture’ – though the text of the paper did not substantively 
interrogate the term ‘culture’ (Nosek et al., 2015). Or consider the book by Chris Chambers on the 
multiple ‘cultural sins’ of the psychological science of psychology (2019, p. 172). Chambers fondly 
conjures how he has ‘always thought of our professional culture as a [castle] – a sanctuary of 
endeavour built long ago by our forebears’ but one which the discipline of psychology has ‘allowed it 
to fall into a state of disrepair’ (see also Flis, 2019 on this passage). Or consider Scott Lilienfeld, one 
of the few participants in the replication crisis literature to address the precarity of researchers, who 
points to this through a language of culture: ‘The corporate culture of academia places young 
scholars in a precarious position, as they feel incessant pressure to secure grant funding even if they 
do not need it [italics added]’ (Lilienfeld, 2017). Or consider the Wellcome Trust, one of the largest 
grant giving bodies in science and medicine, which has established a programme and priority area 
entitled ‘Reimagine Research Culture’, which responds to perceived problems in research 
ecosystems, including problems of reproducibility (Wellcome Trust & Shift Learning, 2020). Notably, 
Wellcome frames its project as ‘let’s reimagine how we work together’ (Wellcome Trust, n.d.). For 
me, the question remains: how do we ensure that ‘how we work together’ is as much concerned 
with the materiality of work as with relations at work? How might such initiatives ensure that 
concern with the interpersonal (how we work together) does not turn things back to being wholly a 
question of culture rather than one of labour (how we work together)? 
To understand the growing interest in ‘research culture’ – in and beyond discussions of the 
replication crisis – we need to turn back to the consolidation of the concept of ‘organizational 
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culture’ in the 1980s. It is the concept of ‘organizational culture’ that provides many of the 
frameworks through which ‘research culture’ is being thought. Organizational culture literature is 
deeply indebted to foundational writings by figures such as Andrew Pettigrew (1979), Geert 
Hofstede (1980) and Edgar Schein (1981). Both Hofstede and Schein wrote as psychologists, and 
much of this body of work was concerned with the norms, attitudes, and values that shape an 
organization. While the literatures on organizational culture did draw on anthropological and 
sociological approaches to culture, psychology (and psychological constructs) were central. Here is 
another exemplification of the circuitry of psychology (Morawski, 2020; Richards, 2002): 
psychological constructs are woven into conceptualizations of organizational culture, which then 
shape understandings of research culture, which then are entangled in the approaches scientists and 
others devise to improve this ‘culture’. In this process, as psychological constructs and formulations 
move across different spheres and are transformed by them, they help stake out the terms through 
which a phenomenon, and a problem, is understood. Such circuitry makes it more difficult for other 
conceptualisations of culture – in which questions of labour might be far more firmly embedded 
(e.g. Terranova, 2000) – to gain a foothold.   
Invocations of research culture also require particular figurations of the scientist. The 
particular norms the scientist is said to embody display the centrality of the vocational and 
professionalizing model that was put in place in the twentieth century, and which ones finds in the 
writings of Robert Merton (1957; see also Shapin, 2010). This model casts its shadow over today’s 
replication crisis. That means that concerns with, and investment in, the vocation and passion of the 
scientist overshadow interrogations of employment relations and the nature of work. That it is 
difficult to discern questions of labour – and exploitation, and appropriation – within the replication 
crisis is in many respects unsurprising. Many have written about the difficulty of acknowledging 
labour issues in writings about the university. Thomas Discenna has argued that ‘the modern 
university was founded on the denial of labor through its appeal to culture as a meta-narrative 
offering legitimacy to the work that goes on within it’ (2018). Christopher Newfield, in tracing the 
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making of the twentieth-century US university, explores the role of professionalized ‘craft labour’. 
Here, the professional was envisaged as able to define their own work – to control their own 
conditions of production – and hence, unlike other workers, manifest a kind of freedom (2004). Nick 
Mitchell has described how tenured academic work frequently does not figure itself as work, but 
rather ‘continues to occult itself, jealously guarding the sociological vestiges of a privilege derived 
from its relation to the clerical world’ (2019). 
 The reticence in the replication crisis literature concerning the potentially pathogenic nature 
of work can be contrasted to the relative ease of discussions concerning potentially pathogenic 
elements within the culture of science. Merton, in his well-known essay ‘Priorities in scientific 
discovery’, stated that ‘the culture of science’, particularly given its enormous emphasis on ‘original 
discovery’ is, ‘in this measure, pathogenic’ (1957, p. 659). Scientists find themselves in an inherently 
stressful situation in which original discoveries are demanded and yet elusive: this encourages ‘self-
assertive claims, secretiveness lest one be forestalled, reporting only the data that support an 
hypothesis, false charges of plagiarism, even the occasional theft of ideas and in rare cases, the 
fabrication of data …’ (1957, p. 659). Here, pathogenesis is thought in relation to a collectivity of 
individual scientists who make up a scientific culture. As traces of the Mertonian model reappear in 
discussions of the replication crisis, current incentive systems in science are interpreted as 
exacerbating these pathogenic tendencies. Potentially pathogenic consequences are understood to 
arise from these ‘cultural’ features of the research landscape, but there is little interrogation of 
broader political-economic processes through which such ‘cultural’ features might emerge and 
intensify. For example, Lilienfeld, in lamenting researchers’ lack of time to ‘think deeply’, links this to 
today’s ‘today’s supercharged grant environment’ (2017), but does not delve more deeply into how 
current configurations of an increasingly financialized and digitalised university might be 
contributing to reorganisations of time and of labour well beyond an incentive system that rewards 
the getting of multiple grants (see Wajcman, 2015). The 2020 study on research integrity 
commissioned by UK Research & Innovation (UKRI) does note that employment and workload 
 14 
conditions, particularly the use of precarious contracts, can have a deleterious effect on incentive 
structures and hence on research integrity (Metcalfe et al., 2020). The report ultimately emphasizes, 
however, the need for greater support and more ‘positive’ incentives  so as to ‘[foster] a culture of 
continuous improvement’ (Metcalfe et al., 2020). Current conditions of labour are, once again, 
presented as a trying and intractable background against which the work of cultural transformation 
might take place.  
 Similar analytical framings are visible when discussions of the replication crisis turn to the 
much lauded norms of transparency, openness, and efficiency (e.g. Begley & Ioannidis, 2015; Polanin 
et al., 2020). These terms are abstractions with complex histories that can be understood and have 
been used in multiple ways (e.g. Strathern, 2000). It is important to note that both virtues not only 
appear in relation to replication but in university ecologies that that have embraced New Public 
Management (Lorenz, 2012). While such terms are said to promise multiple benefits for research 
culture, their practice may well bring many deleterious consequences for research labour. The drive 
towards efficiency, facilitated by transformations in the mode of production, is accompanied, for 
John Welsh, by ‘new techniques of appropriation’ that are ‘brought to bear upon the 
unacknowledged and invisible labourer’ (2020). The commitment towards transparency, 
underpinned by the reliance on audit and evidence, naturalizes, for Neil Cocks (2017), new forms of 
authority in an increasingly corporatized university. 
The values and virtues of transparency, openness and efficiency require further attention in 
discussions of the replication crisis. Understanding their potential implications for labour demands 
getting to grips with how much additional burden – and for whom – is required to make things open 
and to keep track this openness (Star & Strauss, 1999). Levin and Leonelli, in exploring open science 
in biological research, have emphasized how open science requires different kinds of labour. Only 
some of these forms of labour are made visible and are valued; many rely on voluntary, invisible, 
and unremunerated labour (2017, p. 284). Many of the infrastructures and practices that support 
open research and data sharing – whether in the form of coding and software, or the increasing 
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reliance on various platforms to track the registration, stages, and impacts of research – are 
maintained through a mixture of labour that is waged and unwaged, adequately and inadequately 
remunerated, freely given and exploited. Tiziana Terranova’s research (2000) on how ‘free labour’ 
produces culture for the digital economy, and Steven Shapin’s essay (1989) on the transparency of 
the early modern technician to the gaze of his scientific employer beautifully demonstrate how, 
under certain conditions, both commodities and labourers can become transparent – and hence 
invisible (Suchman, 1995). Various efforts to increase transparency and efficiency – along with their 
attendant regulations, modes of surveillance, and additional tasks – exacerbate problems for labour 
(in highly unequal, gendered and racialized ways), and hence intensify the crisis of social 
reproduction in the university. Peterson and Panofsky, for example, in their analysis of metascience 
as a social movement whose engine is provided by the replication crisis, make clear how ‘efficiency’, 
as used within the metascience literature, is envisaged as a way of removing the ‘friction’ that slows 
down research. The aim, here, is once again to create a culture ‘in which self-correction operates 
efficiently’; they point out that it is assumed that there is ‘little or no cost associated with copying, 
sharing, and hosting data’ (2020). This, we should be clear, is a familiar fantasy: a fantasy of work 
without workers (McGlazer, 2020).  
 
Labour in psychology, the labour of psychology  
 
Where might we find labour, then, in discussions of scientific – and specifically psychological 
– research? There is still much research to do on how changing forms of labour inside and outside 
the university have shaped, and have also been shaped by, the discipline of psychology.4 A special 
 
4 Psychology is not the only discipline in which it is difficult to find discussions of labour conditions. 
Zheng (2018), for example, has argued in relation to the discipline of philosophy, that the precarious 
nature ‘of academic employment is the most pervasive and urgent problem confronting the 
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section of Journal of Social Issues addresses the ‘neoliberalization of psychological knowledge’: in it 
Glenn Adams and colleagues argue that the psychological sciences amplify the authority of 
neoliberal systems (Adams et al., 2019), while Marija Gjorgjioska and Ana Tomicic (2019) outline, 
using the example of Social Representations Theory, what they regard as a ‘crisis in social psychology 
under neoliberalism’ . While the special section mentions problems of casualization and 
precariousness, we are still missing fine-grained elaboration of labour practices and how these might 
contribute to epistemic formations. Indeed, there is a paucity of research that relates issues of 
labour to psychology as a discipline – a discipline that has certain distinctive features when 
considered alongside other life and social sciences. One of the aims of this article is, indeed, to 
encourage additional research that might draw the history and sociology of labour into closer 
proximity to the history and sociology of psychology.5 Psychology is a profoundly heterogeneous, 
non-unified discipline that is impossible to cohere into one object with one history (Smith, 1988). 
Today, it stretches from experimental psychology centred on laboratory animals, to exploratory data 
mining of large data sets, to biophysiological research, to clinical psychological research. It is deeply 
embedded in many interdisciplines and other disciplines – including the cognitive, behavioural, and 
affective neurosciences, and behavioural economics. It is taught in faculties of education and 
business as well as health, science, and social science faculties. While its methods and 
epistemological frameworks are also heterogeneous, positivism remains influential in psychology’s 
present as well as its past consolidation as a discipline. Psychology is notable for its extensive use of 
psychology students within psychological experimentation (Leentjens & Levenson, 2013) – which 
 
discipline–and the rest of the academy–today’, and wonders why there has been so little attention 
paid to it. 
5 Note in this regard the 2022 Gordon Cain conference, ‘Let’s Get to Work: Bringing Labor History 
and the History of Science Together’ https://www.sciencehistory.org/event/gordon-cain-
conference-2022.  
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raises a number of unresolved questions concerning ethics, coercion and exploitation. Empirical 
psychological science has a tendency towards mall effect sizes and small sample sizes (Maxwell, 
2004). There is, currently, growing interest in ‘big team’ psychology: this is envisaged as 
collaborative, large teams who work across national borders and who aim to combat methodological 
problems associated with the replication crisis (Moshontz et al., 2018; Forscher et al., 2020)), such as 
the overreliance on samples that have been drawn from ‘Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, 
and Democratic (WEIRD) societies’ (Henrich et al., 2010). And we should not forget that psychology, 
unlike some other disciplines, carries a long and often florid history of named crises that extends 
back many decades (Morawski, 2019). All these aforementioned features of psychology6 merit 
further analysis, both in relation to  discourse concerning the replication crisis, and for their 
potential contribution to making it difficult to locate labour in discussions concerning knowledge 
production in this discipline. Given psychology’s many distinctive attributes, it is perhaps surprising 
that Nicole Nelson and colleagues, in their mixed methods empirical investigation of the discursive 
dimensions of the replication crisis, found many similarities in the ways in which articles from 
psychology and articles from biomedicine have discussed the replication crisis. While psychology 
articles tended to feature more discussions of statistical techniques, and frequently covered the 
failure to replicate long-standing findings such as ‘priming’ effects, there is, Nelson and colleagues 
argue, a ‘clear thematic core to reproducibility discussions’. Biomedical scientists and psychologists 
converge in their assessments both of the sources of replication failure and in their proposed 
solutions to such failure. And here, once again, Nelson and colleagues find, across biomedical 
science and psychology, a preoccupation with problems with the culture of science.  
While it is difficult to locate labour in discussions of psychology, and its histories, directly, 
several science and technology studies (STS) scholars and other social scientists offer fruitful 
pathways for investigating labour in psychology even if they do not specifically focus on psychology 
 
6 My thanks to one of the anonymous reviewers for suggesting several of these. 
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themselves. Such literature probes how epistemological preoccupations and contestations often 
arise from divisions and reorganizations of scientific labour, and these authors also pull into visibility 
forms of labour that are left out of many ruminations on psychological experimentation. Park Doing 
(2004), in examining the work of operatives in science laboratories, has demonstrated how 
epistemic politics that take the form of arguments over expertise are centrally arguments over 
labour. Michael Scroggins and Irene Pasquetto (2020) make visible the intense and often invisible 
labour that makes up data-intensive science and take up Arlene Daniels’ famous essay (1987), from 
the mid-1980s, on invisible labour as that which ‘disappears from our observations and reckonings’. 
Importantly, Scroggins and Pasquetto emphasize how little is yet understood about how data-
intensive methods might be transforming norms of work. They thereby open trajectories still be 
explored in assessing how the emergent field of metascience (Peterson & Panofsky, 2020), as well as 
increasingly data-intensive practices within psychology, might be related to problematics associated 
with the replication crisis. Scroggins and Pasquetto contrast such invisible work with certain 
‘hypervisible work’, which is in part characterized by the enjoyment that is provoked by the 
observation of such labour; into this category they place replication scandals in social psychology 
and elsewhere. Here, one might say that certain kinds of labour tied up with the ‘replication crisis’ – 
namely the labour expended in affectively intense discussions about this named phenomenon – 
could be seen to blot from view many other forms of labour that are less visible to those 
preoccupied by this phenomenon, and arguably more central to analyse if one is to understand it. 
Philip Mirowski (2018, p. 177), in his sharply critical assessment of the Open Science movement, 
lambasts how citizen science, often lauded by open science advocates, frequently means greater 
numbers of unremunerated people being drawn into practices of science, thereby ‘primarily 
serv[ing] as the passive reserve army of labor in the marketplace of ideas’. An emerging body of 
work directly addresses exploitation (and self-exploitation (Brienza, 2016)) in research. Mayssoun 
Sukarieh and Stuart Tannock (2019), for example, focus on the increasing use of sub-contracted, and 
exploited research labour, particularly in research that is led by principal investigators in the Global 
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North while being undertaken by research assistants in the Global South. Their argument raises 
serious questions of epistemology and authorship (what does it mean for publications and data to 
be authored and authorised by researchers who have not in any way been close to their production, 
and who at times exclude from authorship the generators of knowledge?). It also addresses head on 
the political economy of globally produced research. For Sukarieh and Tannock, ‘problems and 
inequities in the industrial organisation of academic research production’ can only be addressed by a 
wholesale restructuring of the ‘distribution of wealth, power and control of research agendas and 
practices among academic researchers’ in the Global South as well as the Global North.  
As a starting point for what I hope might become more extensive investigations of what 
labour in increasingly data-intensive psychological sciences look like, today, I offer brief questions to 
ask in relation to the labour of: (i) researchers; (ii) research participants/subjects; and (iii) workers in 
what we might call ‘para-research’ spaces.  
 
 
1. Researchers  
How might we produce more finely grained models and accounts of current psychological research 
and research practice? What forms of labour constitute it, using which kinds of contracts? How 
might we better understand processes of exploitation, extraction, and appropriation (Welsh, 2020)? 
Have we fully grasped the socio-political as well as epistemic consequences of the ‘new circuitry of 
academic capitalism’ in which, in many locations, it is fixed-term, postdoctoral labour that does the 
bulk of the research itself? How do we grapple with those consequences both in terms of the 
conduct of that work itself, the threats to academic freedom that such conditions pose – and their 
potential bearing on phenomena associated with the ‘replication crisis’? How exactly might labour 
relations inflect epistemic cultures as well as ethos? How do political-economic relations within and 
beyond the university affect disciplinary and interdisciplinary transformations – and vice versa? How 
exactly does the costing of research labour through time-pressured grants shape how research is 
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done? Which labour remains unremunerated and how does this affect epistemic cultures? How do 
new divisions of research labour, or the emergence of new practices of variously skilled work, affect 
how data are collected, compared, gathered, or how experiments are done and recorded? How do 
forms of hierarchy in academic labour intertwine precarity with other forms of dependency (e.g. 
Peacock, 2016), and what consequences does this have epistemically as well as socially?  
 
2. Research participants  
How might psychology better conceptualise research participation as labour? Catherine Waldby and 
Melinda Cooper (2014, pp. 7–8) have emphasised that one of the central historical missions of 
bioethics – the discipline that has maintained epistemological and procedural oversight over 
research participation – has been to protect the research participant from market forces. This has 
made it far harder to protect the research participant through formal instruments of twentieth- (and 
now twenty-first) century labour law. Waldby and Cooper push against this sequestration of 
research participation from labour, through articulating a labour theory of value for clinical labour, 
which they regard as a crucial element of bioproduction (see also Waldby & Cooper, 2008). Their 
interest in thinking research participation as a mode of work is shared with those such as Jill Fisher 
(Fisher et al., 2020) and Roberto Abadie (2019), for whom research ‘guineapigs’ experience various 
kinds of exploitation similar to others who are captured by the precarious gig economy. How might 
such research open up how such labour processes might bear on data reliability and validity – and 
hence on the phenomena under investigation by those preoccupied by problems of replication?  
It is not, moreover, simply in relation to clinical trials in which the bodies, as well as the 
minds, of research participants, are centrally at stake. Labour exploitation might be found in multiple 
modalities of psychological research being conducted today. In addition to the ongoing use of 
undergraduate student labour in psychological experimentation, does it matter that recent years 
have witnessed an enormous rise in psychological studies that use Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk) (Buhrmester et al., 2018; Chmielewski & Kucker, 2020)? While some academic articles, 
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often from disciplines outside of psychology, address labour exploitation and MTurk (Pittman & 
Sheehan, 2016), few within psychology do. And yet it is certainly possible that the labour conditions 
of MTurkers might bear on questions of data reliability and validity that are raised by those 
concerned about a replication crisis. Notably, the only research article I have located that discusses 
the use of MTurkers in relation to psychology and data quality focuses on how best to weed out bots 
(programs that complete human intelligence tasks automatically) and farmers (individuals who 
deploy server ‘farms’ to side-step location restrictions specified within MTurk) (Chmielewski & 
Kucker, 2020). The only mention of payment in that article is in the context of paying ‘genuine’ 
MTurkers promptly so as to aid the process of weeding out illegitimate bots or farmers. Here, once 
again, the question of labour – both the labour of the poorly paid MTurkers, and the political-





3 Para-research spaces  
How far can the vision of the Mertonian collectivity of scientists, who are put under pressure by the 
need for original discoveries, take us in understanding the production of the (increasingly data-
intensive) psychological sciences today? How might we better enumerate, make visible, and include 
in our analyses of the replication crisis, the multiple forms of labour that make up not only 
 
7 A pre-print whose first author is affiliated to a for-profit participant-sourcing platform for online 
research and surveys (the platform offers a ‘MTurk Toolkit service’ that promises to ‘totally 
transform how you use Amazon’s micro-tasking platform’ (CloudResearch, 2015)) concludes that 
there is not a significant problem with labour conditions using MTurk (Moss et al., 2020). 
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experimentation but research audits, research dissemination, and practices of research governance? 
How do we grapple with the frequently invisible, and highly racialized labour relations that underly 
the production of databases, the tagging of content, the scanning of materials into Google and other 
for-profit ‘knowledge providers’ – all of which are a core component of research culture today (see 
Cohen, 2019)? How do the growing numbers of for-profit providers (Holmwood & Servós, 2019) and 
the intensification of market activities affect what kinds of psychological research are conducted, 
how, and by whom? How might a continuing push towards ‘big team science’ in psychology facilitate 
the emergence of new kinds of labour requirements relating to the sourcing, management, and 
analysis of data? What kinds of relations between those in the Global South and Global North are 




The replication crisis in psychology is repeatedly framed as a crisis involving actors who are, for the 
most part, simply named as ‘psychologists’. But once one has enumerated the varied forms of labour 
that make up today’s assemblage of psychological research, use of the generic term ‘psychologist’ to 
denote the main actor in the field starts to seem obfuscatory, rather than acting as a helpful 
shorthand. Which actors are most visible in debates concerning the replication crisis? Who fails to 
reach visibility? Which kinds of psychologists in which kinds of employment contracts come to 
exemplify the figure of the ‘psychologist’? From which epistemic standpoints, gathered in which 
kinds of labour relations, is knowledge about the replication crisis being produced? In thinking 
through the stakes of these questions, we would do well to heed Eli Thorkelson, who argues, in their 
essay on the American university sector, with its extensive reliance on casualised labour, that ‘there 
is no universal subject in the American university, no group structurally able to aspire to 
epistemological totality’ (2014, p. 2). In the replication crisis literature in psychology there does tend 
to be an imagined ‘universal subject’ able to wield epistemological totality: the psychologist. This 
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figure takes on a fantasy-mask: she frequently acts as a kind of Mertonian figure, one in which one 
finds a particular entwinement of ethos and epistemology. But in the wings, off stage, are multiple 
other figures who complicate this fantasy. Those who are keen to ameliorate research cultures or to 
resolve the replication crisis frequently use a language of the ‘we’. Munafò and colleagues (2020, p. 
92), for example, when discussing research culture, writes about how ‘we’ can change it. But who 
exactly is able to be held within the apparent generous embrace of this first person plural? In their 
article they invoke the ‘community’ – the ‘reviewers, editors, panel members, and so on’. But there 
are relatively few workers, of the many that make up the domain of scientific research, that do 
indeed have the capacity to ‘change’ this culture, rather than simply be subjected, in the workplace, 
to particular cultural-economic configurations which they have little possibility of shifting. Which 
kinds of change, moreover, are possible, if one envisages a community of researchers, largely 
divorced from material conditions (see Carpenter et al., 2021)?  The history of labour tells us while 
certain changes to working cultures can be achieved through transformations in conditions and 
governance that are taken on by certain elements of ‘the community’, or encouraged by the guiding 
hand of research funders such as the Wellcome Trust, most have required unionization and labour 
disputes. The term ‘psychology’ figures in particular ways in the replication crisis literature, ways 
that betray a reliance on the language and fantasy of professionalisation.  
The task in front of us today is to ask to what extent such an scene comprising a collectivity 
of individual, professionalized psychologists (aided by the wondrous tools of data science) accurately 
describes how psychology is made. This scene might be more accurately described as a scene made 
up of multiple forms of labour, and characterized by under-analysed forms of exploitation and 
appropriation that point to an intensifying crisis of social reproduction.   
 
Conclusion 
The post-2008 moment, in psychology, specifically, and in the university, more broadly, is 
one in which many have said there are failures of replication and of reproduction. Are there crises, 
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now, in psychology and in academic labour, or is it, rather, that there are, currently, extensive 
discourses of crisis? The title of this article, ‘Replication and reproduction: crises in psychology and 
academic labour, is ambiguous. Like several who have written about the history of psychology or the 
history of the university (Boggs & Mitchell, 2018; Morawski, 2019; Moten & Harney, 1999), I resist 
the inference which is often sparked by today’s crisis language: namely, that if today there is crisis, 
yesterday there was not. Both the history of psychology and the history of the university contain 
many instances of phenomena that can be understood as manifestations of crisis. In relation to the 
university specifically, Moten and Harney’s injunction to ‘realize that academic labor is perpetually in 
crisis and flux’ is an important bulwark against fantasies of equable labour relations in the twentieth-
century university (see also Boggs & Mitchell, 2018; Moten & Harney, 1999, p. 24). Much of the 
replication crisis debates proceed as though economic forces and constraints press on the university 
from the outside. Addressing today’s crisis of social reproduction in the university, alongside other 
sites for the production of knowledge, needs to ensure that the university is understood to be a 
dynamic and powerful contributor to, rather than defensive bulwark against, capitalist 
transformations that come from ‘outside’ (Bacevic, 2018; Baldwin, 2020).  
 How failures of replication and reproduction are identified, named, and analysed matters. 
They matter for how psychology narrates its history and its present, and they matter for how such a 
narration contributes to making psychology’s present and future. Extensive discussions of the 
apparent crisis of replication have found little room for deliberation over the current shape of crisis 
besetting academic reproduction. The multiple workers – both inside and beyond research 
institutions – who run experiments, offer their mental and bodily labour as participants in those 
experiments, make data digital (Cohen, 2019), and much more – are largely not considered as actors 
in the governing stories through which psychology tells its history and present. Psychology’s 
epistemological frameworks have tended not to be grounded in the position or experience of the 
worker: American industrial-organizational psychology, Zickar (2004) has argued, has shown a 
general indifference to labour unions and has had a tendency to identify with management. The 
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hypervisibility of the work of making the replication crisis a phenomenon – a crisis! – is accompanied 
by the invisibility, in discussions of that phenomenon, of much of the labour that makes up the 
psychological sciences. This creates an imaginary in which much of the work of the psychological 
sciences is imagined as taking place without workers. While I started my deliberations here by 
considering the potential salience of the economic crisis of 2007-8 in relation to the emergence of 
the replication crisis, I consider the events of 2007-8 as an exemplary case through which to consider 
how labour conditions are imbricated in knowledge production in psychology more broadly. The 
economic crisis might have brought a crisis in social reproduction in the university into more obvious 
relief, but it certainly did not single-handedly bring about the practices, working conditions – and 
culture – of the psychological sciences today.   
 That questions of ‘culture’ have been central to discussions of the replication crisis but not 
questions of labour takes us back to enduring preoccupations within the academy from the 
twentieth century. Heather Steffen’s research documents different ideologies of labour that have 
characterised the twentieth-century US university. She identifies four common ideologies found in 
critical and narrative writing about the university: the professional, unionist, vocational, and 
entrepreneurial. Different ideologies provide different ways for researchers to imagine ‘their 
relationships to the institutions, social structures, and political economies that constrain and enable 
research, education, and scholarly public service’ (Steffen, 2020). The replication crisis is largely 
conducted using models and registers of the professional, the vocational, and the entrepreneurial. 
What Steffen calls the ‘unionist’ (a model in which multiple forms of activity in the university are 
considered as labour) rarely surfaces.  
But if the post-2008 moment is to be described as marked by failures of replication and 
reproduction, it is also, in a certain sense, mired, too, in particular kinds of re-production. For re-
production, as the sociologist Sarah Franklin (2015) has argued, points, through a Marxist-feminist 
lens, to the ‘conditions of consciousness’ that keep in place the reproduction of existing institutional 
and social modalities. And such modalities frame and constrain what becomes possible and 
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impossible in terms of the working conditions of the academy. Replication crisis talk, in its avoidance 
of discussions of labour, removes from view that which might significantly influence how the 
production and re-production of knowledge (including replication) take place.  
Much of what is being re-produced, as psychology narrates its present, invokes its history, 
and re-makes itself, makes it difficult to perceive, let alone to understand, the current contours of 
today’s crisis of social reproduction in the university. Many within and beyond psychology have been 
preoccupied with a failure to replicate, even as they find it difficult to acknowledge the labour and 
infrastructural conditions through which experiments are reproduced. What becomes visible, and 
what remains invisible, when there is said to be a crisis of replication in and beyond psychology? The 
visible helps frame what is perceived as a problem and hence shapes the forms of intervention that 
are created to address it. I believe we need different analyses both of the problems besetting 
psychology, today, and different imaginaries for how we might address them. This article hopes to 
contributes to such work. It does so by thinking hard not only about what fails to be reproduced, but 
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